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I
n light of the $150 billion bailout of AIG, there has 
been a renewed call for increased federal involve-
ment in the insurance industry, including a proposal 
to extend something similar to the Community Rein-
vestment Act (CRA) to insurance providers. Although that 
seems fair at first glance, simply applying the banking 
model to insurance is problematic for several reasons: (1) 
it contradicts the core business model of insurance; (2) 
it would not address the existing deficiencies in serving 
the low- to moderate-income market; and (3) the current 
fractured regulatory structure has no capacity to admin-
ister, uniformly and cogently, a national program such 
as a new CRA-like requirement. A greater opportunity 
exists in leveraging what insurance does best: mitigating 
risk to encourage investment and innovation and smooth 
unpredictable losses. 
Why the CRA for Banking Does Not  
Work for Insurance
Historically, the CRA was a response to a specific de-
ficiency in the practices of some banks—extracting value 
from a geographic area without an equitable exchange 
of goods (credit) or services. This rationale for the CRA in 
banking does not necessarily apply to insurance because 
the core business model of insurance returns value in the 
form of claims to the communities from which it collects 
premiums. And the adequate return of claims dollars, the 
“loss ratio” statistics of companies and types of policies, 
are closely monitored to ensure that policies are fair 
and that the vast majority of premiums are paid back 
out in claims. Thus, the existing practice of the business 
ensures an exchange of value that is equitable for the 
consumer. In other words, there is no insurance equiva-
lent to redlining.
If the goal, however, is to increase low- and moder-
ate-income (LMI) household financial stability, tremen-
dous benefits can be gained by leveraging the vast engine 
of the insurance industry. The three main assets that 
contribute to the stability of LMI households are wages, 
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homeownership, and retirement savings. There are 
clearly deficiencies in the way the market and govern-
ment provide insurance for these assets; however, those 
weaknesses cannot be rectified by CRA-like regulation 
because there is no single set of providers, such as banks, 
to regulate. Insurance is provided by employers, lenders, 
various agencies of the state and federal government, and 
other financial services providers. The solution needs to 
use both the market and public policy to address these 
various providers. The best way to develop these new 
products is to create incentives and changes in tax and 
other policies, rather than to set quota requirements for 
numbers of policies defined by geography.
What Will Work for Insurance?
For individuals, especially those in LMI households, 
events such as foreclosure, job loss, and pension fail-
ure can be catastrophic. These events are exacerbated 
because neither the industry nor the government has 
achieved success in offsetting risk on a household basis 
(as purchased by individuals), comparable to the suc-
cess achieved at the group or large commercial level, (as 
purchased by large employers, corporations, or unions). 
In proposing solutions, it is important to consider that the 
insurable assets of LMI households (household income, 
homeownership, and retirement savings) are addressed 
by a government insurance program or tax subsidy (or 
both). The government alone cannot provide an adequate 
level of protection for consumers. Thus, the market, 
encouraged by public policy, has an opportunity to create 
the optimal balance between protection and investment.
The Role of Insurance in Addressing the 
Needs of the LMI Household 
The most significant asset of LMI households—
current and future wages—is exceedingly vulnerable 
to the vicissitudes of physical ability, industry health, 
and macroeconomic stability. The private market insur-Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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ance response to those issues—life, unemployment, 
and long- and short-term disability—are unable, in 
their current forms, to adequately replace household 
income for the LMI population. The government solu-
tion, unemployment insurance, is structurally flawed. 
Less than 45 percent of the U.S. workforce is qualified to 
receive unemployment benefits in the event of job loss 
because they work too few hours (part time or seasonal). 
In addition, the benefits max out at an average of $260 
per week, below the poverty line for a family of three. 
Nongovernment unemployment insurance is not widely 
available with one of the few examples being insurance 
connected to payday loans. 
Smoothing Household Income
When asked about life insurance, LMI respondents 
to a recent Federal Reserve survey referred to life insur-
ance positively as “forced savings” that allowed them to 
save for a targeted time after the loss of a wage earner 
more effectively than in a traditional savings account.1 
Although life insurance is a highly efficient income-
smoothing tool, there are very low take-up rates among 
LMI households for the whole or term life products 
that meet this need. Several reasons explain this situa-
tion. First, the distribution channel for life insurance—
agents—is not cost-effective under the current licensing 
and regulatory structure. There is clearly a way to offer 
a streamlined license for agents selling targeted, pro-
scribed policies, similar to how many auto policies are 
sold. This would be most effective on a national basis 
because state lines create no difference in the need of 
buyers for specific life products. Second, the tax ben-
efits of life insurance are less relevant for lower-income 
households, but this too could be rectified, possibly by 
attaching a life-insurance purchase to the Earned Income 
Tax Credit refund process. Finally, there is the issue of 
Long & Short Term Disability. As the hard economic 
times or shrinking retirement accounts have kept many 
older employees working past 65, they are now realizing 
that a widely used income-protection tool—disability 
insurance—is rarely available to workers over 65. As 
with difficult-to-place auto or worker’s compensation, 
market supply could be increased by the implementation 
of a FAIR plan, an assigned risk pool, or other pooling 
mechanism to control for adverse selection. This is an 
issue that should be highlighted by policymakers to draw 
attention to the need for increased market supply.
If we know that securing the wage stream is vital to 
household stability, we can either lower the barriers to 
entering the market via regulatory streamlining or reduce 
the ultimate cost of the product by creating incentives to 
purchase, especially through the tax code. While there 
would be an increased cost to providing this incen-
tive, it goes a long way toward keeping LMI households 
economically secure. It is also an opportunity to extend 
protections and benefits throughout the economy, since 
government already provides a hefty subsidy to middle- 
and high-income households through mortgage interest 
deductions and 401(k)/pension/healthcare pretax con-
tributions. Properly conceived, more targeted insurance 
products could do much to “smooth” household income.
Housing – PMI for Borrowers
Home-ownership rates currently stand at histori-
cally high levels for all segments of the U.S. population, 
including LMI households. Record high foreclosure 
levels and more than two million seriously delinquent 
mortgages have prompted greater scrutiny of the lending 
process. Several risk factors have become apparent; the 
most important among them is agency risk that results 
when mortgage underwriters can securitize their way out 
of bearing the long-term risk. The “insurance” product 
with the greatest take-up rate among less financially 
secure borrowers is Primary Mortgage Insurance (PMI), 
which only protects the lender. The higher yield of these 
loans coupled with PMI is meant to mitigate the cost 
of default for the lender, but while the full cost of the 
interest and PMI is born by the borrower, the borrower 
receives none of the protection. There is also mortgage 
life insurance, which is activated only upon the death of 
the mortgage holder.
The current foreclosure crisis has made apparent 
the high—and in many cases avoidable—costs when 
a mortgage moves from delinquency to foreclosure. 
Many homeowners are not sure of their options and find 
it difficult to navigate the banking system to advocate 
for themselves. As a result, many homeowners have 
simply walked away from their mortgages. Creating 
a PMI for borrowers could provide short- or longer-
term payments in cases of job loss or other economic 
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difficulty to bridge temporary loss of income. It also 
has the benefit of bringing a third payor with a longer 
investment horizon and a separate underwriting 
methodology to the mortgage. In addition, embedding 
insurance into the credit decision and mandating its 
purchase by high-risk borrowers will give borrowers and 
all parties protection in the case of financial disaster. This 
effectively increases the take-up rate, or the percentage 
of people purchasing mortgage insurance, although it 
is a version that broadens the life/economic events that 
qualify for payout beyond that of traditional mortgage 
insurance. Since we are unlikely to revert back to the 
presecuritized environment, submitting a greater swath 
of mortgage lending to an additional underwriting 
protocol— PMI for borrowers—would create additional 
protection against default and predatory lending. Doing 
this might lead to slower increases in homeownership at 
the lowest income levels, since even $50 to 100 a month 
in increased payments will make home purchase more 
expensive relative to renting. However, the increased 
cost of borrowing should accurately reflect risk and the 
social cost of foreclosure. 
Retirement
Retirement gets the least attention when discussing 
financial services for LMI households. Insufficient sav-
ings rates, difficulty managing both investment risk and 
longevity risk (how long you will live postretirement), 
and tax policy that accrues benefits disproportionately 
to high wage earners have all led to a scenario where 
43 percent of households will not have enough income 
in retirement to maintain their preretirement standards 
of living.2 This is exacerbated by the fact that only nine 
percent of all workers saved the maximum allowed, 
$15,500 in a 401(k), and nearly 20 percent had a loan 
outstanding against their retirement account. Know-
ing that Social Security alone cannot provide adequate 
retirement income indefinitely and that individuals rarely 
save enough or invest prudently, the alternative is both 
to mandate and incentivize current workers to more 
realistically participate in their own retirement. The good 
news is that the insurance industry already has the prod-
ucts and structure to meet these needs. 
Perhaps the most important retirement product is 
the fixed annuity. A fixed annuity is purchased before 
or at retirement for a lump sum and then pays out a 
fixed monthly payment. The payment of a fixed annuity 
does not fluctuate based on investment return; it is fixed 
in amount and duration. Annuities can be purchased 
throughout a career, with payments delayed until a pre-
determined age. Teresa Ghilarducci, the noted pension 
economist and academic, has proposed further encour-
aging retirement savings by mandating a five percent an-
nual savings rate for all workers who purchase slices of 
annuities—future monthly payments—throughout their 
working lives. At retirement, this annuity payment would 
be a supplement to Social Security, bringing the majority 
of workers above a 70 percent replacement rate of their 
preretirement income.3 
Retirement planning and savings need to focus much 
more forcefully on stable investment vehicles such as 
fixed annuities. As the past months have shown us, we 
are gambling with the growing segment of future retirees 
who will rely solely on a 401(k) to deliver retirement se-
curity. What retirees and our economy need is a vehicle, 
coupled with targeted savings rates, that delivers stable 
retirement income, not just retirement wealth contingent 
on the performance of the stock market. This vehicle, 
fixed annuities, while a proven, flexible, and efficient 
means for delivering retirement security, suffers from 
confusing pricing and the fear of the unlikely event of 
dying too soon and losing the value of the annuity. Many 
other countries, the UK and Chile most notably, integrate 
annuities into their public pension systems and create a 
way to stabilize retirement income. 
The dramatic shift from fixed, annuitized defined 
benefit plans to variable 401(k) plans in recent years has 
added urgency to the debate. Short of another bailout or 
a Retirement Stimulus Plan for 401(k) holders, increased 
retirement stability will be possible only with a rethink-
ing of the retirement tax and policy structure. Plan spon-
sors have been freezing or terminating defined benefit 
plans at a steady pace for more than twenty years, hav-
ing determined that the combination of changing demo-
graphics and long-term investment risk was too uncertain 
and volatile for a corporation’s balance sheet to bear. So 
while the 401(k)-only solution has clearly been found 
2	 	The	Center	for	Retirement	Research	at	Boston	College,	various	publications,	2008,	available	at	http://crr.bc.edu/index.php.
3	 	Teresa	Ghilarducci,	When	I’m	Sixty-Four:	The	Plot	against	Pensions	and	the	Plan	to	Save	Them	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	
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lacking and defined benefit plans are covering a shrink-
ing minority, the federal government continues to spend 
roughly $115 billion annually to subsidize this system. 
Based on marginal tax rates and levels of savings, those 
benefits accrue largely to middle- and high-income 
earners, who may save regardless, and ignore the LMI 
population that cannot. Since the government is truly the 
insurer of last resort here, the public policy around an-
nuities and strong incentives for retirement savings in the 
United States needs a strong push on the policy front to 
become part of the retirement security toolbox. 
Obstacles to Success
An additional obstacle to the insurance industry’s 
ability to create new products for LMI consumers is the 
industry’s confusingly decentralized regulatory structure. 
Insurance companies and brokers who wish to do busi-
ness nationally must operate under 56 separate state and 
territory reporting agencies with thousands of regulators 
and staff, but with little to no common sense consisten-
cy. There is certainly a need for more uniformity, which 
would not only be easier to follow, but also would be 
easy to regulate. This is true for large-scale policy efforts 
like the ones outlined in this article, but also it would 
protect consumers by insisting on better price transpar-
ency and consistent requirements to disclose the fees 
and commissions paid to intermediaries. 
The heavy administrative burden in response to the 
lack of uniform regulation acts as a tax on innovation. 
The cost and regulatory burden to launch a product—
and have it approved by the 56 different agencies—is 
staggering and dampens new product development, 
especially in riskier, lower-margin areas that might best 
address the needs of LMI households. Exacerbating the 
situation, the position of State Insurance Commissioner is 
a political appointment or elected office that does not re-
quire any insurance expertise or knowledge of the law or 
the industry—in fact, the requirements are less stringent 
than what is required to obtain a basic insurance license! 
The leadership of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, while thoughtful, changes annually, 
making progress on long-term issues difficult. Since little 
institutional insurance expertise, operational or policy, 
exists at the federal level, it is impossible to contemplate 
how a national policy or a regulatory regime, the CRA or 
otherwise, would be implemented.
Conclusion and Next Steps
Addressing systemic financial risk and strengthening 
consumer protection are tasks that have been avoided 
for two generations, a task not made any easier within 
a system that failed to consider the “100 year storm 
event.”4 Widespread underwriting failures, lack of con-
sideration for systemic risk in the insurance industry, and 
a convoluted and opaque regulatory structure generated 
a tremendous tax on our economy. The path forward 
will need to correct for those failures without stifling the 
benefits of innovation and new market development. 
In a recent speech regarding the CRA, Federal Re-
serve Chairman Ben Bernanke asserted that one of the 
goals of the CRA was to lower the “first mover risk” of 
entering new territories.5 Similarly, to address household 
financial stability, tax policy and regulation should be 
engaged to reduce the risk of entering these new markets 
and leverage the development capacity and risk-man-
agement expertise of the insurance industry to meet the 
gaps in the current structure. 
The following actions are suggested to start this 
process:
1. Start a conversation on how the insurance industry 
can play a role in promoting the economic health of LMI 
individuals and communities.
2. Create a national regulatory structure. As recently 
proposed by the “Group of 30,” headed by Paul Vol-
cker, “for those countries lacking such arrangements, 
a framework for national-level consolidated prudential 
regulation and supervision over large internationally 
active insurance companies should be established.”6 
One model is the Optional Federal Charter, a structure 
that would allow insurance companies and brokers the 
option of being federally regulated with one national 
standard, or remain state-regulated, which is the current 
system. Large national and global firms, whose complex-
ity and reach create opportunity for systemic risk, would 
4	 	Alan	Greenspan,	Testimony	before	the	House	Oversight	and	Investigations	Committee,	October	23,	2008.
5   Chairman Ben Bernanke, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “The CRA at 30 Years,” Speech given at the Community Affairs 
Research Conference, Washington, DC, March 30, 2007.
6   Group of 30, “Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability,” January 15, 2009, 59.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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likely be regulated by a sophisticated federal regulator 
housed within the Treasury or other financial oversight 
body. Small companies, mutuals, and brokers may 
choose to remain state-regulated, continuing their close 
access to local regulators. Regardless of form, no serious 
discussion of addressing systemic risk or encouraging in-
novation can go far without modernizing the regulatory 
structure and the engagement of the federal government. 
3. There needs to be a rigorous examination of what 
best serves consumers as either the primary insurer (the 
first firewall against job loss, illness, or foreclosure) or 
the re-insurer (the second line of defense for mortgage, 
wage, health, and retirement insurance). Currently, 
the government is the primary insurer for those who 
will depend solely on Social Security, Medicare, or 
Unemployment Insurance. The public sector has also 
become the insurer of last resort for the mortgages held 
by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). We must 
determine if the existing structure meets the needs of an 
aging population in a globalized economy and, if not, 
whether the policies and incentives discussed here are 
the appropriate hybrid.
4. In a time of financial crisis, we have to be confi-
dent that every tax dollar deferred for retirement savings, 
health care, or mortgage interest is creating value for the 
economy that would not have been created by private 
markets or individuals alone. If tax dollars are deferred 
for retirement savings or housing purchases that would 
have otherwise occurred in the private market, we are 
not effectively using those funds as an incentive for “first 
mover” innovation or to support less financially stable 
populations that may require future public support. The 
existing asset-based tax policy needs to be thoroughly 
examined for fairness, effectiveness, and a demanding 
return on capital.
5. Federal policy should encourage innovation and 
expertise and be housed in a new institution, something 
like a federal center of insurance expertise. The events of 
late 2008 exposed the fact that not only did no one regu-
lator have a full picture of the financial health of large 
international insurers, but there was also little insurance 
expertise at the federal level to adequately address the 
relevant issues. In addition to gathering information, 
the center could act as an incubator to accelerate new 
product development with the carrot of a single, national 
review and approval of new products, avoiding 56 sepa-
rate state requirements. The center could also administer 
a national insurance license for insurance brokers and 
agents. Both of these functions could lower costs for 
consumers without compromising oversight.  Finally, this 
institution could also enforce CRA-like regulation.
Now is the time to creatively and rigorously assess 
what combination of the public sector and industry most 
effectively and efficiently will meet the financial needs of 
both LMI households, which have a tremendous need for 
cost-effective ways to manage income, debt, and retire-
ment risk, and an aging population with stagnant wages, 
depleted assets, and little savings but staggering debts. 
Although that does not look like a CRA, it does create 
ample opportunity to leverage the capacity within the 
insurance industry to offset risk and employ its expertise 
to find the most efficient and effective methods, whether 
public or private. 
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